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Abstract
The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and
intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The
assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human-like characteristics to non-
human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory-of-mind, the ability to infer men-
tal states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally
overlap. Specifically, using a multi-method approach, we test if and how anthropo-
morphism is related to theory-of-mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural
(Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relation-
ship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory-of-mind
brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no con-
sistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions
of the theory-of-mind network. In a follow-up, pre-registered experiment, we
explored the relationship between theory-of-mind and situational and dispositional
anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie
while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind
ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory-
of-mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and
predict the behaviour of the film's characters. No relationship between situational or
dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory-of-mind was observed.
Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and
theory-of-mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly
unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation
between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between
theory-of-mind and anthropomorphism.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Our abilities to infer and predict observed and hidden mental states of
other people, such as their intentions, beliefs, and emotions, shape
our ongoing social interactions. This process, which has been termed
theory-of-mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) or mentalising (Frith,
Wolpert, Frith, & Frith, 2003), is fundamental to human social life.
Similar attributions of mental states are also made towards non-
human agents and objects, and this process, termed anthropomor-
phism, actively contributes to engagement with these agents and
objects (Broadbent, 2017; Hortensius & Cross, 2018). Anthropomor-
phism has been described as the extension of theory-of-mind to non-
human agents (Atherton & Cross, 2018). To successfully humanise
behaviours of non-human agents, or to anthropomorphise, has been
suggested to rely on similar steps to those used when understanding
the agent's intentions and, therefore, may be closely connected to
theory-of-mind (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). Anthropomorphism
may be a foundation from which to improve aberrant theory-of-mind
(Atherton & Cross, 2018). While at first inspection, these processes
appear to overlap at a basic construct level, whether or not anthropo-
morphism is a partial or complete analogue of theory-of-mind remains
unknown. The perception of another's mind, whether human or artifi-
cial in nature, has important consequences for social behaviour
(Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). For instance, mind perception
is required for judgements of agency over an agent's actions in the
case of moral transgressions (Bigman, Waytz, Alterovitz, &
Gray, 2019; K. Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). As mind perception and
its consequences differ per individual (Waytz, Cacioppo, &
Epley, 2010a; Waytz, Gray, et al., 2010), distinguishing these pro-
cesses at behavioural and brain levels is vital in order to understand
their functional meaning and consequences.
Anthropomorphism extends beyond just seeing human features
(e.g., eyes or hands) in non-human agents and objects. It also involves
actively attributing human mental states (e.g., emotions, intentionality)
to non-human agents and objects (Epley et al., 2007). The overlap
with theory-of-mind is already evident in this definition. Anthropo-
morphism is not only driven by perceptual factors (e.g., stimulus cues
such as the presence of a face), but also by a motivation in the
observer to understand and predict the environment (Waytz,
Cacioppo, & Epley, ). This effectance motivation, as coined by
White (1959), is related to exploration and mastery of the environ-
ment, and describes the drive to make sense of a world with uncertain
perception-action links. For example, effectance motivation influences
one's interest and explanations when observing the actions of an
unfamiliar robot. In a series of experiments, Waytz, Morewedge, and
colleagues (2010) showed that this need to understand and predict
the world not only increases anthropomorphism, but that anthropo-
morphism also fulfils this need. Effectance motivation is critical to the
perception of other minds, as this motivation not only drives interac-
tions with non-human agents and objects, but also interactions with
other humans (Waytz, Gray, et al., 2010). Indeed, prediction of
another individual's behaviour is central to theory-of-mind and its
underlying neural network (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). As astutely
described by Heider (1958), extracting invariance out of variance,
inferring intentions and emotions from the behaviour of an agent, is a
fundamental feature of social cognition. Both theory-of-mind and
anthropomorphism are ways to achieve this.
Further support for a relation between anthropomorphism and
theory-of-mind comes from neuroimaging studies. These studies show
that brain regions activated when individuals engage in anthropomor-
phism include regions considered to be part of the theory-of-mind net-
work (Hortensius & Cross, 2018). This network consists of bilateral
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the precuneus and parts of the medial
prefrontal cortex, and has consistently been implicated in tasks examin-
ing how we understand and predict the mental states of other agents
(Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, &
Perner, 2014). For instance, parts of the TPJ are not only activated dur-
ing standardised theory-of-mind tasks, but also when observing non-
human social animations that can trigger attributions of agency, intent,
and other mental states (Schurz, Tholen, Perner, Mars, & Sallet, 2017).
Initial evidence suggests a link between activity in these regions and
more direct measures of anthropomorphism. Activity in the left TPJ and
the Pprecuneus is higher for individuals with an increased tendency to
report the movement of an animated character as biological in origin
(Chaminade, Hodgins, & Kawato, 2007). Activity in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is increased for unpredictable gadgets com-
pared to predictable gadgets, with the former also leading to more
human mental state attributions (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010).
Exploratory results suggest that a disposition to attribute human states
to non-human animals is correlated with left TPJ grey matter
(GM) volume (Cullen, Kanai, Bahrami, & Rees, 2014). While these initial
studies provide first insights into the link between anthropomorphism
and theory-of-mind network engagement, a question remains as to
whether activity within and across these regions of the theory-of-mind
network is enhanced in individuals who are more likely to attribute
human mental states to non-human agents and objects.
Both theory-of-mind and anthropomorphism are multi-
dimensional constructs, with both terms often used to describe a
range of processes. Theory-of-mind is a popular topic of study in the
field of social cognition and has previously been linked to a number of
behaviours from moral development (Killen, Mulvey, Richardson,
Jampol, & Woodward, 2011) to empathy (Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright, 2004). While partial overlap could occur between the
involved subprocesses, theory-of-mind remains an umbrella term that
involves a host of cognitive and brain mechanisms, which may vary by
task (Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015). Different tasks mea-
sure different constructs related to theory-of-mind (François &
Rossetti, 2020). Often used as a catch-all term, anthropomorphism,
too, is a broad concept that can vary depending on the agent, object
and situation (e.g., Ruijten, Haans, Ham, & Midden, 2019). Moreover,
there is large variation in the extent that people anthropomorphise
(Epley et al., 2007; Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010a). For this reason,
we cast a wide net and use several proxies for both concepts with the
idea that the overlap between theory-of-mind and anthropomorphism
can be dependent on the task or situation a person is experiencing as
well as their personality.
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Here, we tease apart anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind at
the behavioural and brain level in order to better understand the
potential overlap between these aspects of mind perception. Across
two experiments, we tested this link using a multi-method approach
thereby unpacking situational and dispositional aspects of mind per-
ception. Instead of one-off judgements of an agent's mind, we use
behavioural and brain measures of dynamic mind perception that
involve understanding, predicting, and updating of the inferred inter-
nal states of an agent over time. In a first exploratory neuroimaging
experiment, we tested if an individual's tendency to engage in anthro-
pomorphism modulates activity in the theory-of-mind network
(n = 108). Specifically, we tested if activity in the theory-of-mind net-
work during the observation of a short social animation is higher for
individuals who are overall more disposed to attribute a mind, con-
sciousness, free will, emotions and intentions to natural entities, non-
human animals, and technological devices. With this experiment, we
asked whether higher levels of dispositional anthropomorphism are
associated with higher levels of activity in the theory-of-mind net-
work (i.e., a positive linear relationship). In a second, preregistered,
experiment, we explored a possible relationship between theory-of-
mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more
detail, using behavioural measures in a representational UK sample
(n = 311). We tested if an individual's tendency to anthropomorphise
in general (dispositional anthropomorphism) or during the observation
of a short social animation (situational anthropomorphism) is predic-
tive of the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the char-
acters in this animation. Using a proxy for general theory-of-mind, we
tested if these anthropomorphism indices are also related to the
understanding of false beliefs. Previous literature has suggested that
in order to better understand the concept of theory-of-mind, it must
be broken down into a collection of more simple and specific pro-
cesses (Schaafsma et al., 2015). Herein we use the term “general
theory-of-mind” to refer and relate to the classic and very broad con-
cept of cognitive theory-of-mind that can be measured by the under-
standing of false beliefs.
2 | EXPERIMENT 1
2.1 | Materials and methods
2.1.1 | Data statement
The data used for Experiment 1 were sampled across five separate
studies undertaken by the authors at the Institute of Neuroscience
and Psychology at the University of Glasgow and the School of Psy-
chology at Bangor University, for which data acquisition was com-
pleted at the beginning of 2020. In each study, besides the main
experimental task, participants completed a functional localiser that
mapped the theory-of-mind network and a measure of dispositional
anthropomorphism. For each study, we included all available data
selecting all participants that completed both the functional localiser
and questionnaire. As two of the studies share MRI acquisition
parameters, we combined these studies into one dataset. In total, we
analysed four complete datasets each with different MRI acquisition
parameters. Dataset 1 contains data from Cross et al. (2019), Datasets
2 - 4 contain data from completed studies or from studies with the
first experiments completed.
2.1.2 | Participants
A total of 108 participants were included in the final analyses, with
sample sizes from each study as follows: Dataset 1: n = 29; Dataset 2:
n = 35; Dataset 3: n = 22; Dataset 4: n = 22. The total sample con-
sisted of 54 women and 54 men, aged between 18 and 43 years old
(Table S1). Participants were recruited primarily through the Univer-
sity of Glasgow and Bangor University participation pools, and by
word-of-mouth. For all studies, participants received verbal and writ-
ten information prior to the study, provided written informed consent
before beginning any study, and were naive to the goal of the study.
On completion of the study, experimenters debriefed the participants
and answered any questions before reimbursing participants for their
time (ranging from £12 to £60). Study procedures were approved by
either the Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging and Research Ethics
Committee of the College of Science and Engineering at the Univer-
sity of Glasgow (protocol numbers: 300170226, 300180084,
300180110, 300180151, 300180208, 300180301) or the Bangor
Imaging Unit and the Bangor University School of Psychology
Research Ethics Committee (protocol number: 2017–16209) and car-
ried out in accordance with the standards set by the Declaration of
Helsinki.
2.1.3 | Dispositional anthropomorphism
To measure dispositional anthropomorphism, the Individual Differ-
ences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ) was used (Waytz,
Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010a). This questionnaire consists of 15 anthro-
pomorphic items for which participants provide a rating on the extent
that natural entities, non-human animals, and technological devices
have a mind of their own, consciousness, free will and intentions, and
experience emotion (e.g., “to what extent does the average robot
have consciousness?”). There were also 15 nonanthropomorphic
items (IDAQ-NA) for which participants provide a rating of functional
features of a stimulus (good-looking, active, useful, lethargic, durable;
e.g., "to what extent is the average camera lethargic?"). These items
provide a control and measure dispositional attribution in general.
Responses are rated on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much).
Participants completed the IDAQ at the end of the fMRI session. The
individual score of dispositional anthropomorphism was calculated fol-
lowing the method outlined by Waytz, Cacioppo, and Epley (2010).
The reliability of IDAQ scale, Cronbach's α = .80, 95% confidence
interval [.75–.86] (Table S2), and the IDAQ-NA, α = .58 [.47–.70]
were comparable with previous findings (Waytz et al., 2018; Waytz,
Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010a).
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2.1.4 | Theory-of-mind network localiser
We used an established localiser that reliably maps the theory-of-
mind network (Jacoby, Bruneau, Koster-Hale, & Saxe, 2016). Partici-
pants passively viewed a 5.6 min animated film (“Partly Cloudy,”
(https://www.pixar.com/partly-cloudy#partly-cloudy-1). The film
depicts how “[b]abies both human and animal are created up in the
stratosphere, by the clouds themselves. One cloud specializes in “dan-
gerous” babies, creating a challenge for his loyal stork that has to
deliver them.” (IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1425244/). The
film contains scenes that trigger mentalising as well as scenes that
show the main characters experiencing pain. Contrasting mentalising
events with pain events identifies the theory-of-mind network, while
the reverse contrast identifies the pain matrix, a network involved in
emotional reactivity to observed pain (Jacoby et al., 2016; Richardson,
Lisandrelli, Riobueno-Naylor, & Saxe, 2018). The latter was used as a
control network to test the specificity in the relationship between dis-
positional anthropomorphism and ToM network engagement.
2.1.5 | MRI data acquisition
Data were acquired with a 3-Tesla Philips Achieva full-body MRI scan-
ner using a SENSE phased-array 32-channel head coil at Bangor Uni-
versity (Dataset 1) and a 3-Tesla Siemens Tim Trio MRI scanner with a
32-channel head coil and integrated parallel imaging techniques at the
Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging, University of Glasgow (Datasets
2–4). Participants were provided with earplugs and headphones to
attenuate scanner noise and allow auditory sound during the func-
tional localiser. Foam padding or inflatable cushions were used to
reduce head movements. Each participant underwent both an ana-
tomical and functional localiser scan while in the scanner, either in
one (Datasets 2–4) or two consecutive sessions (Dataset 1).
There were slight differences between MRI parameters between
datasets. Complete details can be found in Table S3. Here, we highlight
the relevant parameters. Functional imageswere acquiredusing an echo
planar image (EPI) sequence (Dataset 1: TR = 2,000 ms; TE = 30 ms;
32 slices per volume; 3  3  3.5 voxels; no gap; Dataset 2:
TR=2,000 ms;TE=30 ms;37 slicesper volume;3 mm isotropic voxels,
no gap),multi-bandEPI (Dataset 3: TR=2,000 ms; TE=26 ms; 68 slices
per volume; 2 mm isotropic voxels, no gap), and a multi-echo EPI
sequence (Dataset 4: TR= 2,000 ms; TE= 13/31 ms; 32 slices per vol-
ume; 2.75  2.75  4 mm voxels, no gap). The entire cerebral cortex
was covered in all datasets. A three-dimensional T1-weighted (T1w)
imaging sequence scanwas collected (Dataset 1: 1 mm isotropic resolu-
tion, TR= 12 ms, TE= 3.47/5.15/6.83/8.52/10.20 ms, FA= 8, field of
view = 240  240 mm2; Datasets 2–4: 1 mm isotropic resolution,
TR= 2,300 ms; TE= 30 ms; FA= 9; field of view= 192  256 mm2).
For Datasets 3 and 4, a field map was collected in the same session
(Dataset 3: 3.28  3.28  3.3 mm voxels, TR = 488 ms,
TE= 4.92/7.38 ms, FA= 60, field of view= 192  192 mm2; Dataset
4: 2.75  2.75  4 mmvoxels, TR= 488 ms, TE= 4.26/6.72, FA= 90,
fieldof view=220  220 mm2).
2.1.6 | fMRI preprocessing
Before preprocessing, image-quality metrics were calculated using
MRIQC (version 0.14.2) (Esteban et al., 2017). Comparison of
these metrics revealed similar signal and data quality across
datasets (Table S4). Signal-to-noise ratio ranged from 3.59 to 6.77
across datasets, while mean ± SD framewise displacement (FD;
Power et al., 2014) was 0.126 ± 0.050 (Dataset 1), 0.112 ± 0.053
(Dataset 2), 0.093 ± 0.048 (Dataset 3), and 0.163 ± 0.063
(Dataset 4).
Results included in this manuscript come from preprocessing per-
formed using fMRIPrep 1.5.2 ( Esteban, Markiewicz, Blair, et al., 2019;
Esteban, Markiewicz, DuPre, et al., 2019; RRID:SCR_016216), which
is based on Nipype 1.3.1 (Gorgolewski et al. (2011); Gorgolewski
et al. (2017); RRID:SCR_002502).
Anatomical data preprocessing
The T1w image (or images for Dataset 1) was corrected for inten-
sity non-uniformity (INU) with N4BiasFieldCorrection ( Tustison
et al., 2010), distributed with antsApplyTransforms (ANTs) 2.2.0
(Avants, Epstein, Grossman, & Gee, 2008, RRID:SCR_004757), and
for Datasets 2–4 used as T1w-reference throughout the workflow.
The T1w-reference was then skull-stripped with a Nipype imple-
mentation of the antsBrainExtraction.sh workflow (from ANTs),
using OASIS30ANTs as target template. Brain tissue segmentation
of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM), and GM was per-
formed on the brain-extracted T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, RRID:
SCR_002823, Zhang, Brady, & Smith, 2001). For Dataset 1, a T1w-
reference map was computed after registration of five T1w images
(after INU-correction) using mri_robust_template (FreeSurfer 6.0.1,
Reuter, Rosas, & Fischl, 2010). Volume-based spatial normalisation
to one standard space (MNI152NLin2009cAsym) was performed
through nonlinear registration with antsRegistration (ANTs 2.2.0),
using brain-extracted versions of both T1w reference and the T1w
template. The following template was selected for spatial
normalisation: ICBM 152 Nonlinear Asymmetrical template version
2009c (Fonov, Evans, McKinstry, Almli, and Collins (2009), RRID:
SCR_008796; TemplateFlow ID: MNI152NLin2009cAsym).
Functional data preprocessing
Before preprocessing, the dual-echo images of Dataset 4 were
summed. For the BOLD run, the following preprocessing was per-
formed. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped version were
generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. For Datasets
1 and 2, a deformation field to correct for susceptibility distortions
was estimated based on fMRIPrep's fieldmap-less approach. The defor-
mation field is that resulting from co-registering the BOLD reference
to the same-subject T1w-reference with its intensity inverted
(Huntenburg, 2014; Wang et al., 2017). Registration is performed with
antsRegistration (ANTs 2.2.0), and the process regularised by con-
straining deformation to be nonzero only along the phase-encoding
direction, and modulated with an average fieldmap template (Treiber
et al., 2016). For Datasets 3 and 4, a deformation field to correct for
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susceptibility distortions was estimated based on a field map that was
co-registered to the BOLD reference, using a custom workflow of
fMRIPrep derived from D. Greve's epidewarp.fsl script and further
improvements of HCP pipelines (Glasser et al., 2013). Based on the
estimated susceptibility distortion, an unwrapped BOLD reference
was calculated for a more accurate co-registration with the anatomical
reference. The BOLD reference was then co-registered to the T1w
reference using flirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson & Smith, 2001) with the
boundary-based registration (Greve & Fischl, 2009) cost-function. Co-
registration was configured with nine degrees of freedom to account
for distortions remaining in the BOLD reference. Head-motion param-
eters with respect to the BOLD reference (transformation matrices,
and six corresponding rotation and translation parameters) are esti-
mated before any spatiotemporal filtering using mcflirt (FSL 5.0.9,
Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002). For Datasets 2 and
3, BOLD runs were slice-time corrected using 3dTshift from AFNI
20160207 (Cox & Hyde, 1997, RRID:SCR_005927). The BOLD time-
series (including slice-timing correction when applied) were resampled
onto their original, native space by applying a single, composite trans-
form to correct for head-motion and susceptibility distortions. These
resampled BOLD time-series will be referred to as preprocessed BOLD
in original space, or just preprocessed BOLD. The BOLD time-series
were resampled into standard space, generating a preprocessed BOLD
run in [“MNI152NLin2009cAsym”] space. First, a reference volume
and its skull-stripped version were generated using a custom method-
ology of fMRIPrep. Several confounding time-series were calculated
based on the preprocessed BOLD: FD, DVARS and three region-wise
global signals. FD and DVARS are calculated for each functional run,
both using their implementations in Nipype (following the definitions
by Power et al. (2014)). The three global signals are extracted within
the CSF, the WM, and the whole-brain masks. Additionally, a set of
physiological regressors were extracted to allow for component-based
noise correction (CompCo, Behzadi, Restom, Liau, & Liu, 2007). Princi-
pal components are estimated after high-pass filtering the
preprocessed BOLD time-series (using a discrete cosine filter with
128 s cut-off) for the two CompCor variants: temporal (tCompCor)
and anatomical (aCompCor). tCompCor components are then calcu-
lated from the top 5% variable voxels within a mask covering the sub-
cortical regions. This subcortical mask is obtained by heavily eroding
the brain mask, which ensures it does not include cortical GM regions.
For aCompCor, components are calculated within the intersection of
the aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks calcu-
lated in T1w space, after their projection to the native space of each
functional run (using the inverse BOLD-to-T1w transformation). Com-
ponents are also calculated separately within the WM and CSF masks.
For each CompCor decomposition, the k components with the largest
singular values are retained, such that the retained components' time
series are sufficient to explain 50% of variance across the nuisance
mask (CSF, WM, combined, or temporal). The remaining components
are dropped from consideration. The head-motion estimates calcu-
lated in the correction step were also placed within the corresponding
confounds file. The confound time series derived from head motion
estimates and global signals were expanded with the inclusion of tem-
poral derivatives and quadratic terms for each (Satterthwaite
et al., 2013). Frames that exceeded a threshold of 0.5 mm FD or 1.5
standardised DVARS were annotated as motion outliers. All
resamplings can be performed with a single interpolation step by com-
posing all the pertinent transformations (i.e., head-motion transform
matrices, susceptibility distortion correction when available, and co-
registrations to anatomical and output spaces). Gridded (volumetric)
resamplings were performed using ANTs, configured with Lanczos
interpolation to minimise the smoothing effects of other kernels
(Lanczos, 1964). Non-gridded (surface) resamplings were performed
using mri_vol2surf (FreeSurfer).
Many internal operations of fMRIPrep use Nilearn 0.5.2 (Abraham
et al., 2014, RRID:SCR_001362), mostly within the functional
processing workflow. For more details of the pipeline, see the
section corresponding to workflows in fMRIPrep's documentation.
2.1.7 | fMRI data analyses
First-level and second-level analyses were carried out using SPM12
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London) in MATLAB
2018b and R2019a (MathWorks, Natick, MA). Seven mental and nine
pain events identified by Richardson et al. (2018) were coded for the
analyses. These events were derived from a reverse correlation anal-
ysis replicated across two adult samples. Besides mental and pain
events, predictors of no interest were included (FD, six head-motion
parameters, and a subset of the anatomical CompCor confounds
(i.e., WM and CSF decompositions). For one participant, no T1w
image was available and CompCor could not be estimated and
included as predictors of no interest. The model parameters were set
following the recommendations of Jacoby et al. (2016): standard
haemodynamic response function; reference time-bin: 8; high-pass
filtering (128 s per cycle); interactions were not modelled; global
normalisation (scaling); serial correlations ignored). Images were
masked with a GM mask (threshold: 0.8). Simple contrasts (men-
tal > pain; pain > mental) were calculated and the resulting contrast
images were smoothed (5 mm smoothing kernel). For the second-
level analyses, one-sample t tests were used for each dataset
(p < .001 uncorrected, k = 10, with an average GM mask applied).
For the ROI analyses, contrast values were extracted from the six
theory-of-mind regions (bilateral TPJ, precuneus, dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex (dMPFC), middle medial prefrontal cortex (mMPFC),
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC)) and seven pain matrix
regions (anterior middle cingulate cortex and bilateral secondary
somatosensory cortex (SII), insula, and bilateral middle frontal gyrus)
using the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, &
Poline, 2002). Coordinates were derived from Richardson
et al. (2018) and a 9 mm sphere was used for each region (Tables S5
and S6).
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2.1.8 | Main analyses
To test the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and
theory-of-mind activation, and to account for the exploratory nature
of these analyses, we used Bayesian regression analyses. This
approach allowed us to assess the strength of the relationship as well
as assess the evidence for and against the null (no relationship). To
test for the possibility of a linear and non-linear relationship between
dispositional anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind network activa-
tion, we specified a model with mental > pain contrast values as
dependent variable and IDAQ scale scores as linear and quadratic pre-
dictors for each region-of-interest separately. All variables were
centred and scaled before specifying and fitting the models. Given the
exploratory nature of this analysis, we estimated the models with
uninformative (default, flat) priors (Student's t-distribution with mean
of 0, 3 degrees of freedom and a scale of 10). A Gaussian distribution
was fitted to the data, and we used four Markov chains with 4,000
iterations (and a warm-up of 2,000 iterations). Besides an individual
model for each region-of-interest, we fitted a model for all regions of
the theory-of-mind network combined. A similar approach was
employed for the regions of the pain matrix. The {brms} package (ver-
sion 2.12.0) was used in R (version 3.6.3) and Stan (version 2.19.1)
(Bürkner, 2017). All models converged, with Rhat values below 1.1.
We report the posterior mean regression coefficient (b) with esti-
mated error and 95% credible credibility interval. Following the proce-
dure outlined by Kruschke (2018), we used a highest density interval
(HDI) of the posterior distribution and a region of practical equiva-
lence (ROPE) around the null decision rule. This approach uses the
Bayesian posterior distributions for each predictor to help decide
whether it is possible to accept or reject the null value. If the HDI of
the predictor lies within the ROPE the null value will be accepted,
while if the HDI lies outside of the ROPE the null value will be
rejected, and if there the HDI does not completely lie inside or outside
of the ROPE no decision can be made. Similar to the interpretation of
p-values and Bayes factors, we acknowledge that the HDI + ROPE
method has its limitation. However, we deem the inclusion of a deci-
sion rule appropriate in the context of the overall research question as
it provides a categorical decision that will benefit the reader while still
considering the magnitude of the parameter and uncertainty thereof
in contrast to p-values and Bayes factors (Kruschke, 2018).
2.1.9 | Control analyses
One potential problem of the mental versus pain contrast used in the
main analyses could be masking of the effect of interest, that is,
anthropomorphism could modulate activity during events that trigger
mentalising and during events that show the main characters
experiencing pain. To further validate our results and conclusion, we
re-ran control analyses using the hand-coded events from Jacoby
et al. (2016). In addition to events triggering mentalising (four events)
and empathy for pain (seven events), events of interest included
scenes in which the film characters interacted with each other
without triggering internal state prediction (social events; five events),
and events unrelated to the main characters such as other birds flying
(control events; three events). To counteract possible masking, we ran
the following contrasts of interest: (a) mental versus control events;
and (b) pain versus control events. We also included the following
general contrasts: (c) social versus control events; and (d) mental
+ pain + social versus control events. Next, we ran similar Bayesian
models for these contrasts separately to test the extent to which
IDAQ scale scores (linearly or quadratically) predict the contrast esti-
mates across all regions combined as well as for the six individual
regions of the theory-of-mind network. As a separate task-
independent sensitivity control analysis, we extracted contrast values
for the left TPJ and vMPFC based on the coordinates of two previous
studies on anthropomorphism and the theory-of-mind network
(Cullen et al., 2014; Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010).
2.2 | Results and discussion
The median disposition of participants in our sample to
anthropomorphise was 48.5 (on scale from 0 to 150) with an inter-
quartile range (IQR) of 22.25, and a minimum score of 10 and a maxi-
mum score of 101 (Figures 1a and S1). Whole-brain and region-of-
interest analyses showed robust activation for mental events com-
pared to pain events across the theory-of-mind network, and for the
inverse contrast in the pain matrix (Figures 1b and S2–S4). Disposi-
tional anthropomorphism was not a consistent predictor of activity
across the theory-of-mind network (Figure 1c). The estimated poste-
rior regression coefficient for the linear predictor was 0.04, 95% credi-
bility interval [0.04 to 0.12], and 0.05 [0.11 to 0] for the
quadratic predictor. An in-depth look at individual regions of
the theory-of-mind network showed that dispositional anthropomor-
phism scores did not predict activity in these regions (Figure 1d). The
estimated posterior regression coefficients for both the linear and
quadratic predictor varied across regions (Figure 2). While disposi-
tional anthropomorphism scores were weakly predictive of activity in
the left TPJ, with a posterior regression coefficient of 0.13 [0.25
to 0.01] for the quadratic predictor, other regions did not show similar
effects (Table 1, Figure S5). For all predictors 0 was included in the
95% credibility interval. While the HDI of the posterior distribution
overlapped with the ROPE, the data did not provide conclusive evi-
dence on the presence or absence of a relationship between disposi-
tional anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind network activity
(Figure 2). In contrast to the theory-of-mind network, the null value
could be accepted for the regions of the pain matrix (Figures S6–S8,
Table S7). Control analyses revealed that regardless of the type of
contrast used, for example, mental versus pain or mental versus con-
trol, dispositional anthropomorphism did not modulate theory-of-
mind network activity (Figure 3, Table S8, Figures S9 and S10). Simi-
larly, task-independent regions derived from previous reports on the
association of anthropomorphism and the theory-of-mind network
also did not show a relationship between these forms of mind percep-
tion (Table S9).
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These findings provide good evidence that there is no clear or
obvious positive relationship between an individual's tendency to
anthropomorphise and activity in the theory-of-mind network. Upon
closer inspection, the literature does not provide a clear picture either.
A recent behavioural study found no relationship between measures
of dispositional anthropomorphism and direct and indirect
measures of theory-of-mind in children and adults (Tahiroglu &
Taylor, 2019). In the same study, no clear relationship between situa-
tional (e.g., task-based) anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind was
observed. In contrast with these behavioural observations, several
neuroimaging studies found an association between situational mea-
sures of anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory-of-
mind network (Chaminade et al., 2007; Waytz, Morewedge,
et al., 2010). As theory-of-mind describes a way to understand and
predict another agent's behaviour, anthropomorphism can serve as
one way to achieve this (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). Anthropo-
morphising non-human agents could help in improving prediction of
the behaviour of these agents, similar to extracting invariance
(e.g., emotions) out of variance (e.g., behaviour, movement;
Heider, 1958). If so, the overlap and association between
anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind would be stronger at the level
of the situation (e.g., task-based). At this level, it can be expected that
anthropomorphism facilitates theory-of-mind in a straightforward, lin-
ear fashion. A higher need to understand or predict the situation of a
non-human agent would require more attribution of human-like char-
acteristics (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010a; Waytz, Gray,
et al., 2010; Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010). However, at the per-
sonality level, a more complex relationship might be possible.
Exploratory data analysis in Experiment 1 led us to believe that
perhaps the relationship could be better described as a quadratic rela-
tionship, rather than the expected linear relationship. One possible
reason for such a relationship is that people mostly rely on theory-of-
mind for situations in which there is ambiguity in interpretation. In
other words, it is possible that those who fall in the middle of the
scale for dispositional anthropomorphism rely more heavily on
theory-of-mind in situations that have potential for anthropomor-
phism (e.g., during the animated film). Individuals with lower levels of
dispositional anthropomorphism are less likely to use theory-of-mind
as they rarely engage in anthropomorphising non-human agents, while
individuals with higher levels of dispositional anthropomorphism
F IGURE 1 Dispositional anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind network activation. (a) Dispositional anthropomorphism across the sample as
measured with the Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire, (b) activation in the six regions of the theory-of-mind network
during the observation of scenes that trigger mentalising compared to scenes that trigger pain perception during an animated film, no clear
relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity (c) across the theory-of-mind network and (d) within the individual
regions (quadratic predictor in red, linear predictor in blue). Indices are centred and scaled in (c) and (d). dmpfc, dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex; mmpfc, middle medial prefrontal cortex; prec, precuneus; rtpj and ltpj, right and left temporoparietal junction; vmpfc, ventromedial
prefrontal cortex
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readily and efficiently perceive and understand the behaviour of these
agents, thereby requiring no explicit theory-of-mind. Thus, it is likely
that the strength and type of relationship is dependent on the level of
analysis (situational vs. dispositional).
To explore these questions further, we tested the relationship
between measures of theory-of-mind and dispositional and situational
anthropomorphism in a follow up preregistered experiment. While
viewing the same short animation as in Experiment 1, participants
provided ratings on their belief of the capacities of the film characters,
which served as measures of situational anthropomorphism. In order
to establish a link between anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind at
the situational level, we approximated the participant's ability to
understand and predict the behaviour of the characters throughout
the movie. These latter effectance ratings served as a proxy of
theory-of-mind and are related to a process of understanding and
predicting uncertainties in the environment, for example, the internal
and behavioural states of an agent (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010;
White, 1959). Besides dispositional anthropomorphism, we also mea-
sured performance on a false belief task to test if a potential link with
anthropomorphism generalises across measures of theory-of-mind. As
in Experiment 1, we tested for both linear and non-linear
(cf. quadratic) effects. Based on the findings of Experiment 1 and pilot
data (n = 20), we hypothesised: (a) a linear and positive relationship
between situational anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind; (b) a qua-
dratic relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and
theory-of-mind; and we expected that (c) situational anthropomor-
phism would be a better predictor of theory-of-mind than disposi-
tional anthropomorphism.
3 | EXPERIMENT 2
3.1 | Materials and methods
3.1.1 | Preregistration and data statement
The data used for Experiment 2 were collected online, and the OSF
preregistration can be found at https://osf.io/tuq4a. We report all
measures in the study, all manipulations, any data exclusions and the
sample size determination rule.
3.1.2 | Participants
A representative sample from the United Kingdom was recruited
through Prolific (www.prolific.co) stratified across age, sex, and eth-
nicity based on UK Office of National Statistics census data. Our tar-
get sample size was 320 participants, to account for potential
exclusion or missing data. Simulations indicate that robust estimates
are obtained when n > 200 (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). We
F IGURE 2 Posterior distribution for the linear and quadratic dispositional anthropomorphism predictor for each region of the theory-of-mind
network in Experiment 1. The highest density interval of the posterior distribution and a region of practical equivalence around the null decision
rule suggest that for all regions of the theory-of-mind network the null could be not be accepted or rejected for the linear and quadratic
dispositional anthropomorphism predictor. dmpfc, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; mmpfc, middle medial prefrontal cortex; prec, precuneus; rtpj
and ltpj, right and left temporoparietal junction; vmpfc, ventromedial prefrontal cortex
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overshot our target sample, 333 participants completed parts of the
experiment, with 311 of those participants completing everything.
The sample consisted of 154 women and 157 men, aged between
18 and 27 (n = 49), 28–37 (n = 57), 38–47 (n = 60), 48–57 (n = 52),
and 58 or older (n = 93) of Asian (n = 27), Black (n = 20), Mixed
(n = 13), White (n = 241), or another ethnicity (n = 10) (Figure S11).
Participants provided informed consent, were naive to the goal of the
study, and received a debriefing and compensation of £3 upon com-
pletion. The study procedure was approved by the Research Ethics
Committee of the College of Science and Engineering at the Univer-
sity of Glasgow (protocol number: 300190004).
3.1.3 | Rating task
To measure situational anthropomorphism and effectance, partici-
pants viewed the same animated film “Partly Cloudy” as in Experi-
ment 1 and rated 16 short scenes throughout the film. The same
seven “mentalising/theory-of-mind” and nine “pain” triggering events
as in Experiment 1 were used. Participants rated both main characters,
the stork, Peck (Scenes 6–13, and 15–16) and the cloud, Gus (Scenes
4–16), as well as two support characters, nameless cloud and name-
less stork (Scenes 1–3). The characters were not referred to by their
name, but by using “the cloud” and “the stork.” After each of the
16 “mental” or “pain” scenes, the film was paused, and participants
were asked to provide ratings on situational anthropomorphism and
effectance. For the situational anthropomorphism ratings, participants
rated the extent to which they believed the characters of the film
(a stork and a cloud) possessed certain capacities. Participants rated if
the character is able to “choose and control its own actions,” “aware of
itself and its thoughts and feelings,” “do what it wants,” and has “prefer-
ences and plans” and “feelings” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much). These items correspond to the definitions used by Waytz,
Morewedge, et al. (2010), and Waytz et al. (2018) for “free will,”
“consciousness,” “a mind of its own,” “intentions,” and “experience emo-
tions.” For the effectance ratings, participants indicated the extent to
which they felt capable of “imagining what the cloud (or stork) will do
next” and “thinking about what the cloud (or stork) is doing and why” on
a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). These items correspond to
the definitions used for “understood the character” and “feel capable of
predicting its future behaviour” in the study by Waytz, Morewedge,
et al. (2010). For these latter two items, a 7-point scale instead of a
10-point scale was used to allow for presentation alongside the situa-
tional anthropomorphism items. The order in which the anthropomor-
phism and effectance rating items were displayed during the rating
task was randomised for each participant. The focus of the rating was
randomised across participants, with some participants asked to give
ratings for the cloud first and the stork second, while other partici-
pants were asked to rate the stork first and the cloud second. After
4:02 min, the film was paused, and participants were asked to
describe in one or two sentences what they think would happen next
(to a maximum of 2,000 characters including spaces). This served as
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After viewing the film, participants were asked to indicate if they had
seen the film before (yes/no). Eighteen out of 311 participants
had seen the movie before.
3.1.4 | False belief
In the false belief task (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), participants were
asked to read 10 false-belief stories, detailing incorrect beliefs about
the world held by characters, and false-photograph stories, detailing
outdated photographs, maps or signs of the world. Each story was
followed by a statement about the story. Participants were asked to
indicate if the statement about the false-belief or false-photograph
story was true (1) or false (2). The stories were presented for 15 s,
followed by the statements which were presented for 6 s (Spunt
et al., 2015).
This false belief task has previously been shown to robustly acti-
vate the theory-of-mind network (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011). Both the
false belief task and the Partly Cloudy film used in Experiment 1 have
been shown to activate similar regions (Jacoby et al., 2016),
suggesting convergence in the use of activity during these tasks as a
proxy for theory-of-mind. While the task has been used as an explor-
atory behavioural measure of theory-of-mind (Spunt et al., 2015), it
has not been validated as a measure of false-belief reasoning ability
per se. To provide further validation and justification for this task as a
measure of general theory-of-mind, we reanalysed data from two
studies (Darda, Butler, & Ramsey, 2018, Darda & Ramsey, in prepara-
tion). Participants (n = 86) completed the false belief task to localise
the theory-of-mind network while behavioural indices (accuracy and
reaction times) were recorded. Results indicate that accuracy
and response times on the false belief trials of the task were consis-
tently associated with activity within and across the theory-of-mind
network during this task. Accuracy on the false belief trials was posi-
tively correlated to averaged theory-of-mind network activity,
Pearson's r(84) = 0.43, 95% confidence interval [0.24–0.59], while
response times on these trials were negatively correlated with activity
in this network, r(84) = 0.30 [0.09 to 0.48]. These patterns were
also observed for activity within the individual regions of the network
(Figure S12, Table S10, Supplementary Results). These neuroimaging
results suggest that the false belief task can be used as a proxy of gen-
eral theory-of-mind, and that this is reflected in behavioural measures
(i.e., false belief accuracy). Twenty of the 86 participants also com-
pleted the IDAQ. This allowed us to explore the relationship between
dispositional anthropomorphism and activity across regions of the
theory-of-mind network during the false belief task. Specifically, we
fitted a similar Bayesian regression model as in Experiment 1, with
false belief > false photograph contrast values as the dependent vari-
able and IDAQ scale scores as linear and quadratic predictors (number
of observations: 120). Consistent with the findings for activation in
the theory-of-mind network during passive viewing of the Partly Clo-
udy animated film, dispositional anthropomorphism did not consis-
tently predict activity across the theory-of-mind network when
F IGURE 3 Dispositional anthropomorphism does not modulate theory-of-mind network activation across diverse measures. (a) No clear
relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity across the theory-of-mind network when participants read stories containing
false beliefs compared to false depictions of photographs. (b) Posterior distributions for the linear and quadratic dispositional anthropomorphism
predictor for each task measure of theory-of-mind network activity. Dispositional anthropomorphism did not modulate activity in the theory-of-
mind network during passive viewing of an animated movie or during the false belief task. Contrast used per task: false belief versus false
photograph stories (false belief task;1 Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011), scenes that trigger mentalising versus control events
unrelated to the main characters (Partly Cloudy: hand-coded events; Jacoby et al., 2016), and scenes that trigger mentalising versus scenes that
trigger empathy for pain (Partly Cloudy: reverse correlation; Richardson et al., 2018)
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participants engaged in a false belief task (Figure 3). The estimated
posterior regression coefficient for the linear predictor was 0.05,
[0.15 to 0.25], and 0.01 [0.11 to 0.10] for the quadratic
predictor.
3.1.5 | Procedure
Besides the rating task and the false belief task, participants com-
pleted the same dispositional anthropomorphism questionnaire as in
Experiment 1 (IDAQ; Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010a). The order in
which participants completed the parts of the experiment was
randomised, with some participants completing the rating task and
false belief task first, and the IDAQ questionnaire second, while other
participants completed the parts in the opposite order. At the end of
the experiment, participants answered a final question on how often
they engaged with robots as part of a different unrelated research
project. All parts of this experiment were completed through Pavlovia
(https://pavlovia.org/; Peirce et al., 2019), in order to allow flexibility
in the order of completion. The total experiment took 20–30 min.
3.1.6 | Data processing
The five anthropomorphism items were averaged to create a situa-
tional anthropomorphism score, while the two effectance items were
averaged to create an effectance score (Waytz, Cacioppo, &
Epley, 2010a, ; Waytz, Gray, et al., 2010; Waytz, Morewedge,
et al., 2010). Accuracies (percentage correct) for the false-belief and
false-photograph stories were calculated separately (Spunt
et al., 2015), and the responses for the IDAQ and IDAQ-NA scale
were summed separately (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010a). All indi-
ces were centred and scaled before analyses.
The following exclusion criteria were specified in the preregistra-
tion: participants that failed the attention check during the film
(no characters typed, n = 13), who showed no variability in their rat-
ings (SD of <0.5, n = 20), who clicked through the rating task (mean
response duration <1 s, n = 10) or IDAQ (duration <1 min, no partici-
pants), and with an accuracy <50% on the false belief trials of the false
belief task (n = 29) were excluded. Furthermore, participants who did
not complete all aspects of the online task (n = 22) or who had ≥5
missing responses for the false belief task (n = 9) were excluded. Final
n for analyses is 241, with 92 participants excluded.
3.1.7 | Preregistered analyses
We preregistered a Bayesian multivariate regression approach to test
a linear and non-linear (cf. quadratic) relationship between situational
and dispositional anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind. We used a
skew-normal distribution model, as visualising the data showed the
data was not symmetric and normally distributed (Martin &
Williams, 2017). Anthropomorphism ratings during the film and IDAQ
score served as linear and quadratic predictors of effectance ratings
during the film and false belief accuracy. The models were estimated
with weakly informative priors, normal (0,1), which avoids inappropri-
ate inferences that can be the result when using non-informative
priors, without supplying strict information (Gelman, Jakulin, Pittau, &
Su, 2008). A skewed-normal distribution was fitted for both the
effectance and false belief sub-models, and four Markov chains with
4,000 iterations (and a warm-up of 2,000 iterations) were used.
Besides the full model, including all variables, we also specified
the model incrementally. Starting with an intercept-only model, we
then added the predictors in a stepwise fashion following the three
hypotheses: a first model for Hypothesis 1 with only a linear situa-
tional anthropomorphism predictor, a second model for Hypothesis
2 with only a quadratic dispositional anthropomorphism predictor,
and a third model for Hypothesis 3 with both a linear situational and
quadratic dispositional anthropomorphism predictor. Models were
specified in the {brms} package (version 2.12.0) in R (version 3.6.3)
with Stan (version 2.19.1) (Bürkner, 2017). All models converged, with
Rhat values below 1.1. We used approximate leave-one-out cross-
validation based on the posterior likelihood to compare these models
and establish the model with the best fit using the {loo} package (ver-
sion 2.2.0) in R (Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 2017). We estimated the
leave-one-out information criteria for each model, with smaller values
indicating a better fit, and calculated the differences between these
estimates of the different models. In addition, similar to Experiment
1, we used the HDI of the posterior distribution and a ROPE around
the null decision rule (Kruschke, 2018).
3.1.8 | Exploratory analyses
To further map the relationship between different forms of mind per-
ception, we tested the extent to which anthropomorphism was
related to actual predictions made by participants during the video.
The moment the movie was paused corresponded to an event where
one of the main characters (the stork) flies away to another cloud
leaving room for several explanations. An example of a correct predic-
tion would be that the stork seeks help of the other cloud and will
return to the original cloud to continue their work, while an incorrect
prediction would be that the stork leaves the cloud to never return.
Two coders (R. H. and M. K.) rated the prediction on accuracy, on a
scale from 0 (incorrect) to 100 (correct), as well as made a binary deci-
sion (correct or incorrect) and rated the extent to which the prediction
relied on/contained theory-of-mind, on a scale from 0 (very little) to
100 (very much). Predictions made by the participants were randomly
presented to the coders using Gorilla (Anwyl-Irvine, Massonnié,
Flitton, Kirkham, & Evershed, 2020). Besides applying the
preregistered exclusion criteria, participants that already were already
familiar with the film were removed (n = 14) and one additional par-
ticipant was excluded because they did not provide a prediction (but
did not fail the attention check). Final n for the exploratory analyses
was 226. Both the rating of accuracy and theory-of-mind were highly
correlated between the two coders, accuracy: r(226) = 0.76, 95%
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confidence interval [0.70, 0.81] and theory-of-mind: r(226) = 0.76,
95% confidence interval [0.70, 0.81]. Discrepancies, that is, one of
two coders made a different binary decision, were resolved through
discussion. For both the accuracy and theory-of-mind of the predic-
tion, the ratings were averaged across the coders, centred and scaled.
A Bayesian regression model was specified for accuracy ratings and
theory-of-mind ratings separately with linear and quadratic situational
and dispositional anthropomorphism predictors. The skewed-normal
distribution models were estimated with weakly informative priors,
normal (0,1).
3.2 | Results and discussion
Situational anthropomorphism and effectance ratings fluctuated
throughout the film but showed distinct patterns (Figure 4a). A grad-
ual increase in situational anthropomorphism ratings was observed as
the film progressed and the characters became more familiar to the
viewer (average rating across the film: 5.11, 95% confidence interval
[5.09–5.14], first event: 4.53 [4.46–4.57], last event: 5.55 [5.50–
5.61], Cronbach's α = .9838 [.9799–.9873]). Effectance ratings did
not show a gradual increase (average rating across the film: 4.74
[4.70–4.78], first event: 4.77 [4.65–4.88], last event: 4.88 [4.78–
4.98], Cronbach's α = .9626 [.9535–.9707]), but reflected event-by-
event fluctuations and were sensitive to distinct events in the film
(e.g., introduction of new characters, revelation of intent of the main
character). The mean disposition to anthropomorphise was 46 with an
IQR of 26 (Cronbach's α = .78 [.75–.82]), and a minimum score of
6 and a maximum score of 102 (Figure 4b). Mean accuracy on the
false belief task was 0.8 with an IQR of 0.2 (Figure 4c). While there
was a positive correlation between the anthropomorphism indices, r
(239) = 0.30, [0.18–0.41], the effectance ratings and false belief accu-
racy indices showed no such relation, r(239) = 0.01, [0.12 to 0.13]
(Figure S13).
Results from the Bayesian multivariate regression analysis
showed that situational anthropomorphism ratings, but not disposi-
tional anthropomorphism, predicted effectance ratings (Figure 4d).
Specially, only linear situational anthropomorphism ratings, with an
estimated posterior regression coefficient of 0.45, 95% credibility
interval [0.31–0.59], predicted effectance ratings. Neither quadratic
situational anthropomorphism ratings, 0.03 [0.04 to 0.10], nor dis-
positional anthropomorphism, linear: 0.03 [0.14 to 0.09], qua-
dratic: 0.07 [0.01 to 0.16], predicted effectance ratings. No relation
was found between anthropomorphism indices and false belief accu-
racy (Figure 4e). Neither situational, 0.04 [0.20 to 0.11], quadratic
predictor: 0.01 [0.07 to 0.10], or dispositional anthropomorphism,
linear predictor: 0.06 [0.08 to 0.19], quadratic predictor: 0.02
[0.07 to 0.11], predicted performance on the false belief task
(Table 2).
The importance of situational anthropomorphism ratings was also
reflected in the results obtained from the leave-one-out cross-
validation based on the posterior likelihood. The first model, with only
a linear situational anthropomorphism predictor (Hypothesis 1), pro-
vided the best fit for the data (Table S11, Figure S14). Compared to
this situational anthropomorphism only model, a model with only a
quadratic dispositional anthropomorphism predictor (Hypothesis 2) or
F IGURE 4 Situational and dispositional anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind. (a) Situational anthropomorphism and effectance ratings, a
proxy of theory-of-mind, fluctuated throughout the film (average ratings are shown in red and individual participants are represented by black
lines), (b) dispositional anthropomorphism across the sample, (c) performance for the false belief trials, a proxy of general theory-of-mind, of the
false belief task (dashed line indicates preregistered exclusion criteria of <.5), (d) situational, but not dispositional anthropomorphism linearly
predicted effectance ratings, (e) neither situational nor dispositional anthropomorphism predicted false belief accuracy (quadratic predictor in red,
linear predictor in blue). Indices are centred and scaled in panels (d) and (e)
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a model with both a linear situational and quadratic dispositional
anthropomorphism predictor (Hypothesis 3) provided a worse fit or
did not improve the fit, respectively.
For all predictors other than the linear situational anthropomor-
phism predictor for effectance ratings, 0 was included in the 95%
credibility interval (Figure 5). The null value could be accepted for the
quadratic situational anthropomorphism predictor of both effectance
ratings and false belief performance, while the null value could be
rejected for the situational anthropomorphism predictor of effectance
ratings. While the HDI of the posterior distribution overlapped with
the ROPE for the linear and quadratic dispositional anthropomor-
phism predictors, the data did not provide conclusive evidence on the
presence or absence of a relationship between dispositional
anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind indices. Similar results were
obtained when including the participants that did not meet the exclu-
sion criteria or when excluding participants who were familiar with
the film (Figures S15 and S16).
The effectance ratings might partly reflect participants' subjective
evaluation of their ability to understand and predict the minds of the
characters in the film. To circumvent this possibility, we tested
the relationship between anthropomorphism and the accuracy of the
actual open-ended prediction made by the participants during the film
and reliance on theory-of-mind. The average rated accuracy of the
prediction was 33.57 [29.04–38.10], with 75 participants making a
correct prediction and 151 participants making an incorrect predic-
tion. The average rated reliance on theory-of-mind was 53.49 [49.28–
TABLE 2 Estimated posterior
regression coefficient for each predictor
for both theory-of-mind indices
Effectance False belief
Predictors Estimates CI (95%) Estimates CI (95%)
Intercept 0.10 0.26 to 0.04 0.02 0.20 to 0.16
Linear situational 0.45 0.31– to 0.59 0.04 0.20 to 0.11
Quadratic situational 0.03 0.04 to 0.10 0.01 0.07 to 0.10
Linear dispositional 0.03 0.14 to 0.09 0.06 0.08 to 0.19
Quadratic dispositional 0.07 0.01 to 0.16 0.02 0.07 to 0.11
CI (95): 95% credibility interval.
F IGURE 5 Posterior distribution for each predictor for both theory-of-mind indices in Experiment 2. The HDI of the posterior distribution
and a region of practical equivalence around the null decision rule suggest that for effectance ratings, the null could be rejected for the linear
situational anthropomorphism predictor and accepted for the quadratic situational anthropomorphism predictor, while for false belief accuracy
only the null could be rejected for the quadratic situational anthropomorphism predictor
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57.70]. Accuracy of the prediction was correlated with the reliance on
theory-of-mind, r(226) = 0.40 [0.28–0.50] and increased reliance
on theory-of-mind was observed for participants that made a correct
prediction, average rated reliance on theory-of-mind: 68.05 [62.61–
73.49], compared to participants who made an incorrect prediction,
46.26 [40.89–51.63]. A weak but positive relationship was observed
between these exploratory measures of theory-of-mind and situa-
tional and general measures of theory-of-mind (Table S12). Providing
further support for the dissociation between anthropomorphism and
theory-of-mind, results showed that neither situational anthropomor-
phism nor dispositional anthropomorphism was related to the accu-
racy of the prediction or the reliance of the prediction on theory-of-
mind (Figure S17). While situational anthropomorphism linearly
predicted the self-rated ability to understand and predict the behav-
iour of the film characters, it did not predict the accuracy of the actual
prediction made during the film, 0.00 [0.06 to 0.07] or the reliance
on theory-of-mind of this prediction, 0.02 [0.08 to 0.12] (Table S13).
As predicted, a linear and positive relationship between situa-
tional anthropomorphism ratings and a measure of theory-of-mind,
effectance ratings, was observed. As no relationship was observed
between situational anthropomorphism ratings and the measure of
general theory-of-mind, performance on the false belief task, these
results provide only provide partial support for Hypothesis 1. Similarly,
only partial support for Hypothesis 3 was found. Situational anthropo-
morphism ratings predicted effectance ratings better than disposi-
tional anthropomorphism. No quadratic relationship between
dispositional anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind indices was
found, providing no support for the Hypothesis 2. Finally, exploratory
analysis showed that anthropomorphism was unrelated to actual pre-
dictions made by participants.
It remains difficult to determine whether a true relationship exists
between anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind. While situational
anthropomorphism was a strong predictor of an individual's ability to
understand and predict the characters' behaviour during the film,
these effectance ratings can only be viewed as a proxy of situational
theory-of-mind. Neither dispositional nor situational measures of
anthropomorphism were predictors of general theory-of-mind, which
was measured here as performance on the false belief task. Therefore,
we do not claim that these findings are suggestive of a strong relation-
ship between anthropomorphism and measures of theory-of-mind.
The linear and quadratic situational and dispositional anthropomor-
phism predictors differed in their predictive power. Taken at face
value, these results suggest that if there is a relationship between
these constructs, this only holds at the situational level in a linear
fashion.
4 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study, we aimed to further examine the relationship
between theory-of-mind and anthropomorphism. Using a multi-
method approach, we tested if situational and dispositional measures
of anthropomorphism are predictive of behavioural and brain indices
of theory-of-mind while watching an animated film. Across two exper-
iments, we find no evidence for a clear relationship between disposi-
tional measures of anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind. Only
situational anthropomorphism was related to the ability to understand
and predict the behaviour of the characters during the film, but not to
classic measures of theory-of-mind in more general contexts. If a rela-
tionship between theory-of-mind and anthropomorphism exists, it
appears to be more complex than initially thought, making it difficult
to tease apart experimentally. Our results suggest that anthropomor-
phism cannot be considered a mere extension or analogue of theory-
of-mind. We surmise that attributing a mind to artificial agents is
something at least partly different from inferring hidden mental states
of fellow humans.
Results from Experiment 1 provided inconclusive evidence as to
whether dispositional anthropomorphism modulates activity in
regions of the theory-of-mind network. Similar to some previous liter-
ature (Chaminade et al., 2007; Cullen et al., 2014), we saw slightly
more evidence for a relationship between dispositional anthropomor-
phism and activity in one region of the theory-of-mind network, the
left TPJ. Both functional (Chaminade et al., 2007) and structural
(Cullen et al., 2014) associations between this region and dispositional
anthropomorphism have been reported. There is some indication that
the left and right TPJ might underpin context-dependent decisions
related to the social nature of an agent (Carter, Bowling, Reeck, &
Huettel, 2012; Hortensius & Cross, 2018). However, as the null could
not be rejected or accepted, the present result should be interpreted
with caution. Similarly, the left and right TPJ have been implicated in
not only theory-of-mind and related processes, but also in other more
domain-general functions (Darda et al., 2018). While in Experiment
1, we focussed on the theory-of-mind network, functional regions
outside of this network, such as the fusiform face area, have been
implicated in anthropomorphism (Kühn, Brick, Müller, &
Gallinat, 2014). While univariate analysis showed that network activ-
ity did not capture variation in anthropomorphism, other analytic
approaches such as functional connectivity and representational simi-
larity analyses might provide different results. To fully capture the
anthropomorphic perception of non-human agents and objects it is
important to look beyond brain regions implicated in theory-of-mind
or other social cognitive processes, and map activity across diverse
and possibly non-social functional regions using different analytic
tools (Henschel, Hortensius, & Cross, 2020).
Exploratory data analysis in Experiment 1 led us to believe that
perhaps the relationship could be better described as a quadratic rela-
tionship, rather than the expected linear relationship. However, formal
analyses in Experiment 2 did not find evidence for such a relationship.
There was no clear evidence for a quadratic, or linear, link between
dispositional anthropomorphism and the ability to understand and
predict the behaviour of the characters of the film. This suggests that
an individual's likelihood to perceive human states in non-human
agents or objects in everyday life does not strengthen their theory-of-
mind. Situational anthropomorphism, on the other hand, predicted
effectance ratings linearly. Individuals that attributed human features
and mental states to the non-human characters in the film indicated a
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better ability to understand and predict the behaviour of these char-
acters. Experiment 2 enabled us to tease apart the broad concept of
anthropomorphism in the hope of better understanding how situa-
tional and dispositional anthropomorphism differ. While situational
and dispositional anthropomorphism were correlated in the current
sample, they showed a different relationship with proxies of theory-
of-mind. Taken at face value, it seems that dispositional anthropomor-
phism might not influence theory-of-mind-like processes, but that sit-
uational anthropomorphism is one way to increase the prediction of
hidden states of non-human agents. Anthropomorphising the situation
might help us to become more familiar, predict or master a situation,
but people that have a higher tendency to anthropomorphise in gen-
eral do not show a better understanding of a specific situation nor
exhibit increased theory-of-mind. However, care is warranted in term
of how generalisable this finding is, as the evidence on a relationship
between situational anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind remains
mixed at best (Tahiroglu & Taylor, 2019; Waytz, Morewedge,
et al., 2010).
We approximated the multi-dimensional construct of theory-of-
mind using different measures. We acknowledge that these measures
each have their strengths and weaknesses. A recent review that
examined a number of classic theory-of-mind tasks found dramatic
variability in what each task actually measures (François &
Rossetti, 2020). In particular, the authors suggest that there is a lack
of specificity when it comes to the terminology and measures of
theory-of-mind. While, commonly, theory-of-mind is thought to
describe the process of inferring others' hidden mental states, it
appears that a number of classic assessments do not necessarily tap
into mentalising capabilities. It may be that there is a dissociation
between cognitive and affective theory-of-mind (Kalbe et al., 2010),
For example, the false belief task is cognition-dependent, with verbal
intelligence influencing performance (Conway, Catmur, & Bird, 2019;
Taylor & Carlson, 1997), and therefore might only be targeting the
cognitive branch. This implies that different tasks can measure slightly
different psychological constructs, from “perspective-taking” to
“empathy.” While these terms may converge in some situations, it
appears that determining what theory-of-mind actually is, lies in an
area of uncertainty and this is reflected in associated tasks.
A similar, more formal deconstruction of anthropomorphism can
be achieved using terminology from the larger literature on mind per-
ception (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Gray, Gray, &
Wegner, 2007; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Waytz, Gray, et al., 2010),
and would be to distinguish two forms of anthropomorphism. The first
form would be related to the perceived ability of an agent to act inde-
pendently (also termed agency, human uniqueness, or competence),
while the second form of anthropomorphism would be related to the
perceived ability to feel (also termed experience, human nature, or
warmth). As motivation influences the perception of these abilities
(Waytz & Young, 2014), a beneficial avenue for future research would
be to focus on more specific components of anthropomorphism and
theory-of-mind using both behavioural and brain measures to compre-
hensively examine the link between these aspects of mind perception
at the situational and individual level. For instance, one hypothesis
based on our findings would be that there is a dissociation between
affective theory-of-mind, as measured with effectance ratings, and
cognitive theory-of-mind, as measured with false belief accuracy,
when we anthropomorphise agents in terms of ability to act (“this
character remembers”) and feel (“this character is angry”).
Alternatively, distinguishing different components of anthropo-
morphism would provide insight on processes beyond theory-of-mind
that influence or underpin anthropomorphism. Evidence from both
neuroimaging and behavioural studies points to the possibility that, at
least for some aspects, anthropomorphism might be a low-level pro-
cess distinct from theory-of-mind. For instance, implicit anthropomor-
phism, measured by Kühn et al. (2014) as adjectives individuals used to
describe cars that are also applicable to humans, was associated with
activity in the fusiform face area and not in the TPJ and MPFC regions
of the theory-of-mind network. While anthropomorphism is not the
mere perception but also the attribution of human-like characteristics
to non-human agents and objects, perception is an integral part of this
process (Heider, 1958). When inferring the behavioural and internal
states of a non-human agent, one has to describe these states using
labels. As suggested by Tahiroglu and Taylor (2019), language relevant
to theory-of-mind could facilitate explaining and describing the behav-
ioural and internal states of the observed agent. This, however, does
not imply that theory-of-mind is necessary for anthropomorphism.
Epley et al. (2007) distinguish between weak and strong forms of
anthropomorphism, with the distinction that in the latter people truly
believe that a non-human agent has the ascribed characteristics while
in the former people act as if the non-human agent has the ascribed
characteristics. Rather than being an active process underlying anthro-
pomorphism, theory-of-mind could merely provide a way to describe
the agent or situation (Tahiroglu & Taylor, 2019).
Observing, inferring, and predicting internal states of non-human
agents and objects could be partly dependent on low-level processes
that are distinct from those active when encountering human agents. A
two-stage process of anthropomorphism would suggest that these early
low-level perceptual processes are complemented at a later stage by
using language derived from theory-of-mind. Anthropomorphism could
be the end result of an otherwise largely perceptual process. This two-
stage process explains why measures that probe the ability to under-
stand and predict the behaviour of the characters in the film were
related to situational anthropomorphism. Inferring and understanding
the behaviour of agents is a mixture of complex interactive predictive
processes, ranging from perceptual processes (e.g., action observation
and prediction; Cross et al., 2012) to theory-of-mind-like processes. The
extent to which interactions with non-human agents trigger similar
social cognitive mechanisms as do interactions with other humans is still
up for debate. Thus, researchers have to entertain the possibility that
interactions with non-human agents might trigger processes that are
not social in nature or do not match one-to-one with the processes that
are active during interactions human counterparts (Cross &
Ramsey, 2021; Henschel et al., 2020).
In order to better understand the way humans attribute socia-
lness and even form social relationships with non-human agents and
objects, a better understanding of the role anthropomorphism and
HORTENSIUS ET AL. 15
theory-of-mind play in these new interactions is warranted. Here, we
used a multi-dimensional, multi-method, representative-sample
approach, combining both exploratory and confirmatory analyses, to
provide new evidence on the relationship between these important
facets of everyday social cognition. Future research combining brain
and behavioural measures of anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind
across similarly diverse samples will help us to better understand how
people develop social bonds with humans and non-human agents
alike, across situations and individuals.
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